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Harold Langsam thinks that consciousness is a wonderful thing, and he wants to articulate 
what that wonder consists in. To do so, he puts his cards on the table early on. If you don’t 
already share most of Langsam’s commitments then you’ll need to entertain them for the 
duration. This might be a stumbling block if you share very few of them, so here’s a list: 
Rationalism: a priori knowledge is possible, un-mysterious, and relatively abundant. 
(7) 
Essentialism: metaphysical categories like properties and universals have intrinsic 
features which make them what they are, and which account for the existence of 
necessary relations between them (8). 
Nonreductionism about mental states and mental properties: “… mental properties are 
neither structural physical properties nor causal properties that are realized by physical 
properties. In other words, mind is different from body.” (18) 
Authority of introspection: introspection is a ‘direct’ and dominant source of evidence 
about lots of things, but in particular about the (intrinsic) properties of conscious 
mental states (19-21). 
Primitivism: the intrinsic natures of the phenomenal characters of experiences are sui 
generis and inexpressible. 
Folk-psychological realism: terms like ‘belief’, ‘desire’ and ‘knowledge’ refer to 
propositional attitudes, which are psychologically real categories of mental states. 
There are several passages early on which purport to show that the various theses are 
consistent and mutually supporting. If you’re suspicious about all of them, well, Langsam’s 
probably not writing for you. At various points he tells us that he thinks arguing over these 
positions is a distraction – that he ‘knows of no serious philosophical arguments that purport 
to show’ that a priori knowledge isn’t possible, that there aren’t necessary relations between 
distinct properties, or that introspection could be defeated by argument. Engaging with these 
debates would be to engage with philosophers who are ignorant, misled, deluded or 
hypocritical about the nature of philosophy. 
The book’s main thesis is that consciousness (exemplified by perceptual experiences and their 
associated phenomenological properties) is wonderful – which is to say: philosophically 
interesting – because it is one of a few domains in which we can acquire something like 
synthetic a priori knowledge. Langsam argues that by reflecting on our conscious experiences 
of the world, and on those of their properties which are available to introspection, we can 
learn about lots of relations which do or do not hold between them. In so doing, we come to 
grasp truths about these ‘intelligible’ relations (they are ‘intelligible relations’ because they are 
available to reflection). The fact that we can grasp such truths just by this process of reflecting 
on our perceptual experiences is, in Langsam’s terminology, wonderful: it demonstrates that 
there are intelligible relations there for the grasping. By a priori reflection, we come to know 
truths about relations between the mind and world.  
This thesis – the wonder of consciousness – appears at the start and at the end, but drives the 
central chapters of the book, which concern perceptual experience and phenomenal properties, 
mental causation, the rationality of beliefs, and the appropriateness (or otherwise) of some 
desires and their objects.  The notion of ‘consciousness’ involved is not explicitly theorized; 
this isn’t a monograph about higher-order thought theories or the kinds of things that might 
appear in a philosophy of psychology volume. Nor is the (rather crucial) notion of ‘reflection’ 
investigated: Langsam takes it as given that we know reflection when we’re doing it.  
In most cases the mere fact that we can reflect on possible interrelations between our 
experiences and their phenomenal properties, or between pleasurable sensations and our 
desires for them, is taken to be sufficient for showing that there exists intelligible relations 
between them. He doesn’t provide further explanation of what he thinks the mechanism is that 
enables or facilitates our ability to get to know about these intrinsic natures which, in turn, 
enable us to acquire a reflective grasp of the relevant properties. Rather, the arguments 
proceed by suggesting that we can reflect on certain features of our mental lives, and that since 
we can, there must be some sort of intrinsic something that enables this to happen. 
So a couple of questions stand out: for starters, what is this link between reflection and 
intrinsic properties? Assuming that ‘to reflect’ is just to have thoughts about something, it’s 
not at all clear that Langsam’s account of the mere fact that I can think about something helps 
to elucidate how I end up learning anything more substantial than that very (mere) fact: that I 
can have those thoughts. When I have a conscious thought about the house-move I might 
conduct in the following weeks, I might go through a range of other thoughts (Have I 
budgeted to afford the deposit as well as the van hire? Can I lift the sofa by myself? Is there 
anything more to my life beyond constantly moving house?). From these thoughts I might be 
tempted to think or suppose that my possible future house-move thoughts have a range of 
properties – perhaps they’re insignificant properties, but they’re intelligible properties none-
the-less. Whether we should reify such properties isn’t questioned: that we can think about 
them shows that there are such properties. And when I think about those properties, I can 
reflect on how they’re related to each other, and so establish their intelligible relations. It’s not 
clear that I’ve learnt very much in the process, unless we also suppose (reifying again) that 
there’s something like a bunch of causally efficacious and intelligible intrinsic properties of the 
future house-move thoughts that give rise to these relations and enable me to do this all 
thinking. If there must have been, then we’ve learnt something which looks a bit more 
philosophically substantial: that my future house-move thoughts have intrinsic properties.  
Is this an abductive argument? Or an indispensability argument? Or a transcendental 
argument? It certainly seems to be a little worryingly thin: we postulate the existence of these 
intrinsic properties of future-house move thoughts, and at the end we learn that we’ve learnt 
something wonderful (intelligible) about those house-move thoughts, vis. that they have these 
intelligible intrinsic properties which stand in these intelligible relations. Whether this is a 
decent way to acquire knowledge of the intrinsic properties of thoughts, should any of either 
exist, depends on what kind of argument it is; the propriety of abductive inferences, 
indispensability arguments and transcendental manoeuvres are much discussed, but not here.  
The second issue also concerns reflection: is it informative or reliable? Take the analogy with 
introspection: Langsam thinks that introspection gives us a posteriori evidence that 
reductionism is false. He also thinks that it’s obvious (upon reflection) that we should never let 
our introspections be overturned by argument. But while most post-Cartesian philosophers 
might be prepared to countenance the thought that introspection is a defeasible source of 
evidence – that even if it’s reliable (and that’s questioned too) it rarely delivers certainty – the 
issue never comes up with Langsam. There are various options to play with here; for example, 
Fiona MacPherson recently defended a disjunctivist theory of introspection on states involving 
phenomenal characters.  But just as Langsam doesn’t seem to question the certainty of 
introspection, so similarly he doesn’t address the defeasibility of reflection, and in lacking a 
worked-out account of that, his repeated claims about the intelligibility or ‘wonder’ of 
consciousness are less wondrous. 
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